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As for Rousseau’s practice of authorship in the corrupt
regime, Kelly makes a compelling argument. Rousseau was
braver than others, he was willing to expose himself to the
authorities, and he was seeking the truth about politics as an
intellectual. The argument gets less convincing when Kelly
discusses Rousseau’s views on the good society. In the good
society, philosophers also have a clear responsibility. There are
times, it seems, when seeking the truth directly conflicts with
promoting the good. According to Kelly’s Rousseau, it is irre-
sponsible to seek the truth for its own sake or even to amuse
oneself with the life of philosophy. Self-censorship, as well as
state censorship, is necessary to preserve the good and create
good citizens. Philosophers should “behave as good citizens
first and philosophers second” (p. 46). As Kelly puts it,
“Rousseau is prepared to encourage the unorthodox not to
advance their dissenting opinions publicly and to speak and
act as if they accept all the sentiments of sociability” (p. 40).
Moreover, “the most dangerous intellectuals are those who
attempt to transform political life by subjecting the senti-
ments of sociability to critical scrutiny” (p. 45). 
But should the “good” society not be open to criticism,
even harsh criticism? Time and again, Kelly applauds
Rousseau’s desire to be the kind of public intellectual whose
certainty of his own virtue (and ability to direct the public
good) excuses political scrutiny of the issues. Yet who decides
on the content of the good? Here, all the problems with
Rousseau’s “general will” should be remembered. Though
Kelly rehearses arguments of critics who charge Rousseau
with “coercive pathology” (p. 117), undermining free consent
and indoctrinating and misleading citizens, he continually
returns to the point that Rousseau’s philosophic activity was
entirely compatible with his devotion to justice. According to
Kelly, “Roussseauian authorship requires the ability to distin-
guish between respectable and unrespectable prejudices . . .
between useful and other truths” (p. 49). 
Ultimately, for Rousseau and for Kelly, the role of intellec-
tuals in the good society is to bind citizens to the nation. I
remind readers that this is only one interpretation of
Rousseau’s politics. Kelly acknowledges that Rousseau is the
author of Julie, a romantic novel, and that some readers might
take away another view. But apparently they would be wrong!
Kelly observes that “Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques is an
extended demonstration of the way misreadings of Rousseau
and his books reflect on their readers” (p. 113). In readings of
Julie and Emile, Kelly warns us to remember Rousseau’s insis-
tence on independence, the decadence of romantic love, and
the “incompatibility of novels and republican citizenship”
(p. 112). 
Scholars will certainly find Rousseau as Author well worth
reading. As a conservative defense of Rousseau, the questions
are compelling and important and the readings subtle and
interesting. Yet though Kelly casts a fresh eye on familiar
themes such as philosophy and politics, censorship and the
arts, the behavior of citizens, and truth and the public good,
in my view, his eye is too focused on defending Rousseau’s
philosophy against his democratic critics.
Domestic Violence and the Politics of Privacy. By Kristin A.
Kelly. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 209p. $39.95 cloth,
$16.95 paper.
— Cynthia Grant Bowman, Northwestern University
Problems caused by the sanctity of the private sphere when
dealing with domestic violence have long been the source of
a good deal of writing and discussion. Kristin Kelly’s book
combines a very good summary and critique of classical polit-
ical thought and modern theorizing about the public/private
split with an empirical study. She then uses conclusions
drawn from that study to construct a more complex model of
the relationship between the public and the private, one that
is more appropriate for the analysis of domestic violence. Her
goal is to develop “an alternative approach to understanding
and renegotiating public and private boundaries that more
effectively balances familial and individual privacy with the
need to reframe battery as a behavior subject to public sanc-
tion” (p. 84).
Kelly first traces the origins of the public/private dichoto-
my through classical formulations in Locke and Mill, point-
ing to the two different and inconsistent models in Locke’s
writing, depicting the demarcation as between the family and
the state in his response to Filmer’s argument in defense of
monarchy, but between the individual and the state in the
construction of the social contract. Both approaches leave the
protection of women within the family to the patriarchal
head of the household, clearly an inadequate remedy when he
is their assailant.
Kelly then discusses a number of modern feminist critiques
of the classical privacy paradigm and describes attempts by
radical, conservative, and liberal feminists to reconceive the
public/private split. Applying each theory to domestic vio-
lence as the touchstone, she concludes that all are inadequate
and, in fact, that “it is not clear that the proposed recon-
structions are any more capable than the classical liberal
model of addressing the complex dilemmas present in
instances of domestic violence” (p. 57).
After discussing the history of the legal treatment of
domestic violence and describing some of the legal strategies
that now exist, Kelly criticizes Second Wave feminism as hav-
ing focused on the law and on obtaining remedies from the
state. This criticism is only partly accurate, for feminists in
the late 1960s and 1970s engaged in a good deal of commu-
nity work as well—establishing shelters and advocacy groups
and lobbying not only for legal change but also for other
forms of assistance to victims. Nonetheless, her conclusion
that law is limited in its effect on domestic violence is clearly
right. Although national crime statistics show that since the
adoption of such legal remedies as orders of protection and
lawsuits against nonresponsive police, domestic violence in
the United States has decreased (see, e.g., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Violence by Intimates:
Analysis of Data on Crimes by Current or Former Spouses,
Boyfriends, and Girlfriends, 2000, pp. 1, 2–3), it still exists at
unacceptable levels.
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Up to this point, Domestic Violence and the Politics of
Privacy tells a relatively old story, though one which is very
skillfully reviewed. What is unique about Kelly’s book is that
she then follows the theoretical summary and critique with
empirical work, interviewing persons who work in the domes-
tic violence field—legal advocates, activists, policymakers,
shelter workers, attorneys, and police officers—asking for
their views on issues relating to privacy and domestic violence.
From their responses, she concludes that legal intervention is
an important but inadequate remedy, limited in ways that
could be addressed (by the infusion of more public funds, for
example) and limited because intervention via the legal system
is too individualistic a response to a problem that is both mul-
tifaceted and, in many aspects, cultural in its scope. The per-
sons interviewed instead emphasize a preventive approach to
reducing domestic violence, involving extensive education,
community participation, and coalitional work.
Combining her discussion of theory with these insights
from practice, Kelly derives a new model for analyzing the
private/public split and its impact—a triangular model
instead of a binary one, with the family, the community
(essentially the institutions of civil society), and the state
forming the three points of the triangle, and the sides repre-
senting the boundaries. Thus, for example, the boundary
between the state and the family is made up of structures such
as search-and-seizure laws, due process rights, legislative man-
dates and programs, contracts, bureaucratic structures and
rules, administrative law, police procedures, and physical bar-
riers (p. 115). Yet the boundaries themselves are changing
products of an ongoing democratic process (p. 162); they will
shift and must be constantly reevaluated (p. 139). The advan-
tages of this approach, Kelly says, include its emphasis on
community participation and democracy and the encourage-
ment of more links between public and private resources in
the struggle against domestic violence. The new model also
more adequately addresses the complex needs of victims—
their economic and relational needs, for example, as well as
their need for both public remedies and for privacy.
There are also problems with Kelly’s new model. Most
important, where does the individual appear in this triangle?
Are there not both conflicts and boundaries between the indi-
vidual and the family, the individual and the community, the
individual and the state? While she explicitly recognizes the
problems involved in conflating the individual and family in
classical analysis and modern conservative feminism (p. 81),
her model appears to repeat this error. Nonetheless, it is a sub-
stantial improvement on earlier conceptions in a number of
ways. First, it highlights that the public/private relationship is
neither binary nor a zero sum game. Second, her model
includes nonstate groups as actors in the campaign against
domestic violence. Third, and perhaps most important, it
emphasizes that addressing domestic violence requires a mul-
tifaceted approach, involving different points of entry and a
variety of players and programs, including community educa-
tion, group advocacy and support, and differing approaches
designed to fit the needs of diverse communities.
Jacobins and Utopians: The Political Theory of
Fundamental Moral Reform. By George Klosko. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003. 216p. $35.00 cloth, $17.00 paper.
— Peter G. Stillman, Vassar College
The subtitle of George Klosko’s book accurately represents his
concerns. The author focuses on important theoretical state-
ments from classical Greeks through Lenin about how to
effect fundamental moral reform. So his perspective differs
from utopian scholars who study the vision to be established
and political historians who look at revolutionary activity.
Klosko focuses on means, or rather, theorizing about means
and strategies, not on ends.
Klosko develops his themes historically, through an analy-
sis of important figures in the history of fundamental change.
Very quickly the central analytic categories surface. He begins
with Plutarch’s lives of Lycurgus and Solon. He finds in
Lycurgus one important and recurrent model for fundamen-
tal moral reform, a model that Klosko labels “educational
realism”: Lycurgus uses political power (backed by violence if
necessary) in order to educate the citizens to virtue. By con-
trast, Solon is a reformer: He changes laws and constitutions,
but does not attempt to transform social and educational rela-
tions. Presenting another alternative model, Socrates attempts
fundamental moral reform not through force but by persua-
sion of individuals; any society-wide transformation incited
by Socratic questioning requires spontaneous interactions
among those whom the gadfly has stung and changed. 
Educational realism and individual persuasion leading to
spontaneous social transformation are Klosko’s two central
themes; Solon’s reformism concerns him little here. This book
was originally a course and then a series of lectures, and
Klosko uses those origins to his advantage. As befits a course,
he examines major theorists (like Machiavelli and Marx), as
well as theorizing activists (notably Robespierre and Lenin),
always from the perspective of realizing radical change; so the-
matically the book involves seeing famous figures from an
unusual angle. The original lecture form means a clear and
comprehensible presentation, no matter how recondite the
topic.
For instance, Klosko sharply distinguishes Socrates from
Plato: Whereas Socrates tries to transform individuals only
through argument, Plato sees Socrates’ mission as a failure
and so in the Republic seeks to define the conditions, no mat-
ter how extreme, under which radical moral transformation
could occur. In presenting his views, Klosko navigates
through a series of interpretive issues, from grouping the
Socratic dialogues to opposing the Strauss-Bloom reading of
the Republic; but he does so lucidly, rapidly, and with good
arguments.
Other pairings and interpretations may be less controver-
sial but no less interesting. Unusual when ideal societies are
under consideration, More plays a bit part here—as an advo-
cate of persuading rulers with arguments and without force.
Machiavelli enters because of two practical insights: It takes a
bad man to seize power but a good man to rule well; and
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